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CHAPTER 13
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
13.1. Introduction
Criminal accountability is a state monopoly, a right and obligation at the same time. The state has the right 
to exercise the so-called punitive power against the citizens (individuals), and may enforce its power by 
force in accordance with the laws – and citizens shall abide. Also, it is an obligation in all cases where 
injury has been suffered due to the violation of the legal order (the rules of social coexistence), if e.g. there 
are natural person victims as well (assault, robbery, theft, homicide, etc.), In these cases neither the victims 
or their families, nor the community cannot legally exercise punitive power against the offender, since 
there is no legal revenge, and vigilantism or vigilante justice is punishable by law. Therefore, victims of a 
violation are „in need” of receiving protection. Consequently, it is an obligation to exercise punitive power 
– this rule cannot be ignored in the case of unlawful acts punishable under the criminal code. Punitive 
power and the several rights that are parts of it are exercised by state organs, such as the authorities acting 
in criminal matters (investigative authority, prosecution service, courts of law, penitentiary institutions). 
In a democratic rule-of-law state, the punitive power is: the state’s – constitutionally limited – public 
power to hold the perpetrators of a crime accountable under criminal law.
Under our modern circumstances, the types of criminal activities, the movement of perpetrators are 
not bound by country borders; in many cases, the crime committed shall ab ovo affect more countries 
(smuggling of narcotic drugs). Sometimes, due to escape, the perpetrator should most certainly be 
tracked down in a foreign country. The right and practice of criminal cooperation define those forms, 
in which the states concerned can ask for help from each other in these cases (see in Subchapter 4).
There are incidents or events, which – due to their extraordinary (negative) significance – are not 
restricted to one state, we could say that these violate the values of a larger geographical region (Europe) 
or the whole civilized world. Their prevention and tackling are also such questions, which require the 
cooperation and joint, synchronized action of the states. These issues are considered regulatory issues 
by international criminal law (see in Subchapter 3).
In this chapter, in addition to the above, we will also deal with the position of the joint fight against 
transnational crime in the European legal framework, thanks to the Union’s development (see in Subchapter 5).
13.2. The Characteristics and National Nature of Criminal Law
One fundamental characteristic of criminal liability is the principle of legality (see Textbox 1). The 
philosophic-moral fundament of this is that criminal liability is typically guilt-based, i.e. the perpetrators 
deliberately chooses between “right and wrong”, by making a choice about their criminal action. If that 
is the case, so they know the crimes and their punishments, it is to be expected that they choose the 
“right”, but if not, they shall bear responsibility for their actions.
In modern rule-of-law democracies, the legislator (parliament) representing the people decides what 
constitutes a crime, and accordingly, this entity also makes a decision on the applicable punishments. 
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This also embodies the so-called criminal demand: i.e. if any conduct is declared to be punishable, then 
the state’s criminal demand is expressed thereby.
Principle of legality: the most important and generally recognized principle of criminal 
law, included in numerous state constitutions. It means that criminal law accountability 
may occur only for such action, which was declared to be a crime by law at the time it has 
been committed, and that only such punishment may be imposed, which was provided 
by law at the time of the commission of the crime. Another name used for this principle 
is the principle of substantive law legality. The two essential elements are normally 
indicated with Latin expressions: nullum crimen sine lege and nulla poena sine lege.
Therefore, what constitutes a crime in a country, could, in principle, paint a very diverse picture 
in the different countries, but it still can be declared that the violation of the most important and 
fundamental rules of the people’s peaceful coexistence is similarly a crime everywhere, such as taking 
a life (homicide), assault, libel, violation of private property, violation of sexual self-determination, but, 
e.g., counterfeiting legal tender (forgery of a legal payment instrument) as well.
In addition, there may be such interests, value approaches rooted in social past, cultural traditions, which, 
in case they are violated, are met by the given society choosing the instrument of criminalization to prevent or 
sanction them. Such typical issue is, even today, the culpability of prostitution, use of narcotic drugs, abortion, 
suicide – we can see quite significant differences in this field even in Europe. As for our topic, the details bear 
no significance, but it is clear that there is a (small) part of criminal prohibitions, which thus demonstrates 
a so-called cultural dependency. Those culpability rules should be treated as a further category, which 
– contrary to the above two points of origin – are justified by considerations of rather political nature; 
such as, the provisions punishing homeless people or those assisting refugees in Hungary.
Also, it is important to briefly mention that the scope of culpability varies over time as well, and 
as the social value system along with the mindset of the people living in it, and he interests of the 
ones in need of protection change as well, so must criminal law also be transformed: today, adultery 
is no longer punishable, neither are sexual relations between couples of the same sex, and, mutatis 
mutandis, earlier the intrusion into IT systems, the “forgery” of electronic money, the falsification of a 
tax return, or cloning human tissue were not punishable, while these are now considered crimes based 
on the legislator’s decision. If we continue this train of thought, we need to ask the question, whether 
we should connect criminal law liability to those actions, which cause injury through the application 
of automation, robotization or artificial intelligence (e.g. when an autonomous self-driving car kills a 
human, a factory robotic arm causes permanent disability to a human due to malfunction).
Likewise, the legislator decides what kind of sanctions (punishments) should the judge apply against 
perpetrators, and while imprisonment and fines are considered as generally applicable punishments, 
work or labor punishment or the “variety” of other deprivation punishments is quite colorful.
Criminal law regulation and the operation of the criminal justice system are necessarily and 
traditionally connected to the territory of the country, to the social organization (state) that exercises 
supreme public power thereon, and the country borders enclose the administration of justice as well: in 
that very moment, when a foreign element appears in the criminal justice system, e.g. an evidence needs 
to be acquired from abroad (i.e. from another country, from its territory), or the escaped perpetrator 
needs to somehow be brought back from abroad, then the given country’s justice system is, basically, in 
need of the other state’s assistance, if it wants to enforce its criminal demand. This “help” by the other 
state could be achieved through complicated legal procedures and political-diplomatic negotiations 
(international criminal cooperation, see below in Subchapter 4).
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13.3. International Crimes and the Accountability of Perpetrators
It was in the aftermath of World War II (WWII), when for the first time in world history an attempt 
was made to hold the war criminals – not just politically – accountable. The work of the international 
military tribunals in Nuremberg and in Tokyo, and the actual results of their administration of justice 
could be interpreted in many ways, but it is beyond doubt that by their action the paradigm of individual 
liability was consolidated, and the conceptual clarification of the crimes against peace, against humanity 
and war crimes finally happened. War crimes were substantially on-going at that time, when – first 
separately, then – in 1943, the later victorious allied powers (USA, the USSR, and the UK) issued the 
Moscow Declaration, in which, basically, they forecast legal accountability and instead of the former 
war practices, neither mass executions, nor politically-based retaliations took place, but justice was 
administered by international tribunal.
“The United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union have received from many 
quarters evidence of atrocities, massacres and cold-blooded mass executions which are 
being perpetrated by the Hitlerite forces in many of the countries they have overrun and 
from which they are now being steadily expelled. The brutalities of Hitlerite domination 
are no new thing and all people or territories in their grip have suffered from the worst 
form of Government by terror. What is new is that many of these territories are now being 
redeemed by the advancing armies of the liberating Powers and that, in their desperation, 
the recoiling Hitlerite Huns are redoubling their ruthless cruelties. This is now evidenced 
with particular clearness by the monstrous crimes of the Hitlerites on the territory of 
the Soviet Union which is being liberated from the Hitlerites and on French and Italian 
territory. Accordingly the aforesaid three Allied Powers, speaking in the interests of the 
32 United Nations, hereby solemnly declare and give full warning of their declaration as 
follows: At the time of the granting of any armistice to any Government which may be set 
up in Germany, those German officers and men and members of the Nazi party who have 
been responsible for or have taken a consenting part in the above atrocities, massacres 
and executions will be sent back to the countries in which their abominable deeds were 
done in order that they may be judged and punished according to the laws of these 
liberated countries and of the Free Governments which will be erected therein. Lists 
will be compiled in all possible detail from all these countries having regard especially 
to the invaded parts of the Soviet Union, to Poland and Czechoslovakia, to Yugoslavia 
and Greece including Crete and other islands, to Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, 
Belgium, Luxembourg, France and Italy. Thus, Germans who take part in wholesale 
shootings of Italian officers or in the execution of French, Dutch, Belgian or Norwegian 
hostages or of Cretan peasants, or who have shared in the slaughters inflicted on the 
people of Poland or in the territories of the Soviet Union which are now being swept 
clear of the enemy, will know that they will be brought back to the scene of their crimes 
and judged on the spot by the peoples whom they have outraged. Let those who have 
hitherto not imbued their hands with innocent blood beware lest they join the ranks of the 
guilty, for most assuredly the three Allied Powers will pursue them to the uttermost ends 
of the earth and will deliver them to the accusers in order that justice may be done. The 
above declaration is without prejudice to the case of the major criminals whose offences 
have no particular geographical location and who will be punished by a joint decision 
of the Governments of the Allies.”
Excerpt from the Moscow Declaration, October 1943;
Three Allied Powers Declaration on Atrocities
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Exactly this preemptive warning established a significant obstacle for the defendants of the 
Nuremberg cases to refer that there were no rules, which would have declared their actions as crimes, 
before their commission.
International crime is every crime that violates or endangers the interests of 
international community, and the culpability of which is based directly or indirectly – 
i.e. through internal law – on international law. There are two groups: international law 
crime is the crime that endangers or violates the most fundamental values or interests 
of the community of nations, and the peace of human societies. Classifying an action 
as such a crime does not depend on national law, but its culpability is based directly 
on international law, and the perpetrator’s (individual) criminal liability derives directly 
from the rules of international law (e.g. crimes against humanity, war crime, aggression, 
piracy etc.). The other group includes the so-called transnational crimes (e.g. trafficking 
of narcotic drugs), in this case, the obligation to criminalize a given conduct by the 
states is based upon an effective international treaty, customary law or other source of 
international law.
Therefore, the issue of international-law-based criminal law liability, obviously, is the most 
important development of the recent decades, and with it the regimes that exercise otherwise unlimited 
supreme public power on their own territories are subject to certain limitations: the perpetrators are to 
be held liable for committing the most severe crimes against humanity and war crimes (e.g. genocide, 
slavery etc.) even if some power groups commit these in “traditional” armed conflict; for state purposes; 
in civil war; under military invasion, or maybe under revolution. This issue is dealt with by the so-
called law of armed conflicts and the international humanitarian law, which will be not discussed in 
this chapter.
The most important station of this development was, in 1998, the incorporation of the Statute of 
the (permanent) International Criminal Court (ICC) into an international treaty signed by the UN 
Member States in Rome, on 17th July 1998. The Court started the preparation of its work in 2002, 
and the first case was the procedure against the leader of the Congolese Militia, Thomas Lubanga 
(with the judgment delivered in 2012). Except the Criminal Court established by the treaty, there are 
other international criminal tribunals as well, but these concern violations committed in geographically 
specific or time-specific conflicts and operate as ad hoc or temporary tribunals (e.g. actions committed 
in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, actions committed during the genocide in Rwanda). The ICC 
proceeds if the national courts are unable or unwilling to proceed in high profile crimes (this is the so-
called principle of complementarity). The work of the court is burdened by many difficulties, because 
there are still some great powers, which are not members of the treaty (e.g. USA, China, India), but 
still, more than 120 countries of the world – including Hungary – ratified it, and after several conflicts, 
its activity is necessary to hold the criminals accountable and to mitigate the victims’ injuries, and 
in general, to curb global violence. In the last 20 years since the signing of the Statute, 86 million 
civilians died and more than 170 million people became victims in more than 250 conflicts.1 There is 
a Hungarian judge at the ICC, seated in the Hague, Péter Kovács, former constitutional court judge.
Child Soldiers – The Lubanga case
In April 2002, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) ratified the Rome Statute (thereby 
contributed to its entry into force in July 2002), thus the case could be brought before the ICC and the 
investigation could be commenced. Pursuant to this, several people were accused, including Thomas 
Lubanga Dylio, the leader of the armed group exercising power in Congo. The charge was enlisting and 
using children under the age of 15 years. The ICC examined the guilt of Lubanga between 1 September 
1 Coalition for the ICC: www.iccnow.org
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2002 and 13 August 2003. According to the charges, in the mentioned period, the organization was 
responsible for the voluntary and forced joining and use of many youths under the age of 15 years, 
which is considered as a war crime under the ICC’s jurisdiction. One of Lubanga’s enlistment methods 
could be mentioned as an example, according to which families living in the territory under his control 
were obliged to hand over one cow, money or one child to the armed group. Therefore, if a family had 
no such animal or enough fortune, they were forced to “submit” their child. The trial was opened in 
January 2009. A total of 67 witnesses were heard and 1373 items of evidence were presented. On 14 
March 2012, the Court found Lubanga unanimously guilty, and on 10 July 2012, sentenced him to 14 
years of imprisonment, as co-perpetrator, for the felony of forced and voluntary enlistment and use 
of children under the age of 15 years. The verdict does not mean that Lubanga is not guilty in other 
crimes, he has committed several others as well, such as the killing of nine UN peacekeepers in Ituri 
in February 2005 or the felony of sexual violence. These were not part of the charges brought by the 
ICC, because the jurisdiction of the Court has a so-called complementary characteristic, so it only 
proceeds if the national authorities of the defendant’s home state are unable or unwilling to proceed. 
Since the national (Congolese) rules had no provisions regarding child soldiers, and Lubanga was 
already in custody at the national level for other crimes – e.g. killing peacekeepers –, he only had to 
face the charges of enlistment and use of children before the international forum. Evidence was found 
that children in Lubanga’s organization received hard training and in the case of disobedience severe 
punishment was imposed. Mostly girls were used for housekeeping and sexual purposes. However, 
sexual violence was not part of the accusations. The enlistment of children, happening in any way, 
and their use as soldiers is a permanent, continuous violation of international criminal law, which 
ends if the child attains the age of 15 or gets out of ranks of the armed force or group. Until mid-2007, 
approximately 34,000 children were released from different armed forces in Congo.2
13.4. Interstate Cooperation in the Field of Criminal Matters
The oldest form of tackling internationally mobile perpetrators and international crimes is cooperation 
between the respective countries’ law enforcement (justice) authorities. Its original purpose was to 
prevent the perpetrator from avoiding criminal law accountability, thus cooperation was exercised 
against the interests of the person concerned. Since the middle of the 20th century, the importance of 
resocialization (reintegration into their own social environment after the prison life) of the perpetrators 
(convicts) has increased as well; therefore, today, in most forms of international criminal cooperation 
the interests of the person concerned are taken into consideration. Consequently, three interests prevail 
in international cooperation: the state asking for help, the state providing it, and the person concerned.
However, pursuant to the general principles of international law and the universally acknowledged 
doctrines of sovereignty, states – when exercising their right to hold someone criminal accountable, the 
so-called ius puniendi – have, in principle, unlimited jurisdiction, so it is possible that several states 
have jurisdiction regarding the same action (so-called positive jurisdictional conflict). Nonetheless, 
the criminal law rules exactly determine the jurisdiction as well. May the relevant provisions of the first 
Hungarian Criminal Code, the so-called Codex Csemegiensis, be presented here as an example to this, 
along with the similar provisions of currently effective criminal law. However, one rhyme by Doctor 
Deodatus is an interesting curiosity, who, in 1884, rhymed the then effective Criminal Code. Herein, 
we present here those lines (translated), which dealt with jurisdictional issues.
2 Description of the case: Molnár–Tóth 2016, 66–76.
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Act V of 1878 (Codex 
Csemegiensis, the first 
Hungarian Criminal Code)
Legal rhymes of Doctor 
Deodatus (1884)
Act C of 2012 (effective CC) 
and other Acts
5. § The scope of this Act shall 
apply to the whole territory 
of the Hungarian State, with 
the exception of Croatia and 
Slavonia.
Felonies and misdemeanors 
committed in this territory by 
either native Hungarians, or 
aliens shall be punished under 
the provisions of this Act. (...)
5. § This present Bill shall lay 
out the law of the whole land,
Not for Croatia and all 
Slavonic-held land.
And this shall be it all,
On this land we own,
For those who sinned in here,
Regardless of their home. (…)
3. § (1) Hungarian criminal law 
shall apply
a) to crimes committed in 
Hungary,
b) to crimes committed on 
watercraft sailing or aircraft 
flying under Hungarian 
flag outside the territory of 
Hungary,
8. § Native Hungarians, who 
committed any felony or 
misdemeanor defined herein 
abroad shall be punished 
according to this Act.
8. § If Hungarians native act 
against this Bill,
Even if abroad (the law does 
apply still)
We’ll only use this law against 
all of them
(If their luck turns bad and they 
end up back home then.)
3. § (1) Hungarian criminal law 
shall apply (…)
c) to any act of Hungarian 
citizens committed abroad, 
which are criminalized in 
accordance with Hungarian 
law.
9. § Under the provisions 
of this Act the alien who 
committed any (...) felony or 
misdemeanor abroad – if his 
extradition has no contractual 
or customary ground, and the 
minister of justice thereby 
ordered the initiation of 
criminal procedure, shall be 
punished according to this Act.
9. § We also punish foreigns, if 
they indeed did the crime,
Even if our peoples don’t agree 
to extradite.
But process can only and only 
then be called to open,
If said so by those, who surveil 
law and order.
3. § (2) Hungarian criminal law 
shall apply
a) to any act committed by non-
Hungarian citizens abroad, if
aa) it is punishable as a crime 
under Hungarian law and in 
accordance with the laws of the 
country where committed (…)
(3) In the cases described 
in Subsection (2) criminal 
proceedings are initiated 
by order of the Prosecutor 
General.
11. § In case of felony or 
misdemeanor committed 
abroad, criminal procedure 
under §§ 8 and 9 shall not 
be initiated if the act is not 
punishable under the law 
of the country where it was 
committed neither under 
Hungarian law; or it ceased to 
be punishable under any of the 
above; or if the punishment 
was released by the competent 
foreign authority.
11. § For felonies and 
misdemeanors committed 
abroad,
There is no proceedings by 
anyone to be brought:
If under these here rules, 
or those in forum delicti 
commissii,
It’s already been punished, 
exempted or dismissed.
(no such rule)
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Act V of 1878 (Codex 
Csemegiensis, the first 
Hungarian Criminal Code)
Legal rhymes of Doctor 
Deodatus (1884)
Act C of 2012 (effective CC) 
and other Acts
14. § If such punishment shall 
apply under the alien law to 
any felony or misdemeanor 
committed outside of the 
territory of the Hungarian State, 
which is not accepted by this 
Act: it shall then be changed 
to a type of punishment in this 
Act, which is most suitable to 
it.
14. § If need be for a 
punishment
Not known to us here,
We’ll look into our law,
Till there’s one that fits the bill.
According to the second 
sentence of Article 48 
Subsection (2) of the Act 
XXXVIII of 1996 on 
international mutual legal 
assistance in criminal matters: 
If a punishment or measure 
imposed by a foreign court 
judgment does not fully comply 
with the Hungarian law, the 
court, in its final order, shall 
determine the applicable 
punishment or measure under 
the Hungarian law in a way 
that it complies the most with 
the punishment or measure 
imposed by the foreign court 
(...).
17. § Native Hungarians cannot 
be subject to extradition to 
another state’s authority.
Natives of another state of 
the Monarchy can be subject 
to extradition only to his own 
state authority.
17. § Hungarian natives
We shall never extradite
To another country,
But we’ll let Austrians be 
returned home in a round-trip.
Article 13 (1) of the Act 
XXXVIII of 1996 on 
international mutual legal 
assistance in criminal matters: 
Except this Act provides 
otherwise, Hungarian citizen 
can only be subject to 
extradition if,
a) the person subject to 
extradition is simultaneously a 
citizen of another state, and
b) has no address in the 
territory of Hungary.
Interstate cooperation fortified by traditional international treaties or so-called reciprocity provides 
the framework for classic forms of criminal cooperation, and the specific procedure is determined by 
the request principle, i.e. wherein the requesting state applies to the state requested with a request 
for mutual legal assistance, and the state requested will decide under its internal law rules of criminal 
cooperation. According to international law, the requesting and the requested states are equals, their 
sovereignty applies equally.
If following their acts, perpetrators successfully flee to another country or anytime escape during an 
ongoing procedure against them (with them being “on the loose”), it is a highly important question for 
the given state to get them back to successfully conduct the criminal procedure and impose punishment. 
Since, in a physical sense, none of the states can reach for the person sought after, i.e. it is legally not 
allowed to e.g. send police officers to the territory of another state to capture the person concerned, 
the states are both forced to and need cooperation with the other state. A classic institution of this is 
extradition. It is worth to mention that in many cases, extradition – even though it means a legally 
established procedure – serves as a political-diplomatic tool, in case of an important person or case, 
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states set aside their law enforcement interests without hesitation, if they might count on any benefit on 
their part on the stage of world or bilateral politics. A situation, when a sentenced person is transferred 
back to his/her home country to continue the execution of punishment there could be considered as a 
similar tool: in a professional (i.e. resocialization) aspect, it is more efficient if somebody serves out the 
punishment in their home country, but it is beyond doubt that political-diplomatic considerations may 
be primary in the background of such decisions. Let’s look at some examples.
Transfer of Sentenced Persons – the Ramil Safarov case
In 2004, a brutal homicide was committed whereby an Armenian soldier attending an English language 
course held by the Zrínyi Miklós National Defense University died in Budapest. An Azerbaijani soldier, 
Ramil Safarov, was accommodated in the next room to the Armenian officer (Gurgen Margarjan), who 
decapitated Margarjan with an ax one night. In 2006, for this action of felony homicide committed 
deliberately with premeditation, with particular cruelty and malice aforethought, the Hungarian courts 
sentenced him to life imprisonment (subject to review no earlier than after 30 years – pursuant to the 
criminal laws effective at that time) and expulsion from Hungary for 10 years. Azerbaijan requested 
the transfer of the inmate, who has already been serving his sentence in a Hungarian prison, from the 
Hungarian Government under a 1983 (Council of Europe) Convention. The transfer took place on 31 
August 2012. With the solidified Azeri-Armenian conflict in the background, Safarov was celebrated 
as a hero in his country and upon his return, he received Presidential pardon and was promoted instead 
of continuing the execution of his imprisonment.
Armenia immediately interrupted the diplomatic relations with Hungary, which are still not 
reestablished on the level as they were before the case transpired. According to the joint statement 
of the then Ministries for Public Administration and Justice, and Foreign Affairs “Hungary acted in a 
transparent manner, respecting the relevant rules. Hungary respects the international law concerning 
every State and expects from its international partners to do the same. Hungary keenly appreciates 
Christian Armenia, and the culture and traditions of the Armenian people. Hungary considers the 
Armenian party’s steps regarding diplomatic relations regrettable.” (1 September 2012)
Interpol
Interpol is an international organization (International Criminal Police Organization), which was 
established in 1923 with a purpose to facilitate the work of national police forces in the fight against 
transnational (cross-border) crime. Currently, 192 countries are members, its headquarters is located 
in Lyon, and Hungary was among the founders (even though, left for political reasons, and rejoined in 
1981). The most important activity of Interpol is the operation of a global wanted persons system that 
allows any country’s police authority to request wanted person (red notice) or wanted object notice 
applicable to all member states. “Interpol notices” are very effective tools in looking for fugitive 
criminals, stolen artifacts or counterfeit documents all over the world. Moreover, the Interpol staff can 
provide effective help to national authorities with data and legal assistance, work supporting criminal 
cooperation, but it is important that – contrary to the popular, but misguided belief – they cannot 
autonomously investigate in any state’s territory.
International police cooperation: international crime prevention and law enforcement, 
i.e. the cooperation of state police authorities has great significance in the field of crime 
prevention, crime detection and investigation, when procedural actions need to be 
carried out in the territory of more countries amounting to a subsequent accountability 
for a crime, or gathering evidence (searching, collecting, recording, eventual analysis 
thereof). However, the international mutual legal assistance in criminal matters is the 
legal framework of the international coordination of the so-called justice authorities’.
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13.5. The Regional Achievements of the European Union
The need for joint action to combat crime as part of European integration, essentially and in a legally 
relevant way, appeared in the ’90s, more precisely with the creation of the European Union (1993), 
when the Member States (MS) determined it a so-called common concern. In the past twenty-five 
years, there has been a significant development of law in this field as well, including, in general, the 
followings: it is a key question to the MS, how much of their punitive power deriving from sovereignty 
and how exactly will they transfer to the organization they established for the sake of progress, with 
particular attention to the fact that in many cases, combating transnational crime is more effective and 
more successful at the EU level. The protection of sovereignty is guarded by the balancing system 
of mutual guarantees and principles, which not only sets up a framework, but also excludes effective 
cooperation in urgent cases, or when the case concerns more than two states. However, in Europe and 
in the European Union, the development of law is going through a fundamental change of approach 
regarding the system of rules in criminal cooperation. Even though community integration, originally, 
did not extend to criminal cooperation, the European Union established by the Maastricht Treaty 
opened room for it as well, and it could be said that the EU MS tightened the web of EU legal protocols 
in the field of criminal cooperation.
As a general characteristic of the relevant regulation it may be mentioned that the conventions and 
treaties concluded by the MS, on the one hand, reflect and reinforce the former agreements – mostly 
adopted under the aegis of the Council of Europe –, but on the other hand, operating with such novel 
and hitherto desirable tools, which truly show the commitment of the states to develop a more effective 
criminal cooperation, and its introduction is verified by the slowly ubiquitous European integration.
For these reasons, the development basically proceeds with baby steps. It has two directions: 
political consensus precedes legal changes, which are then reflected in some legislative act being 
enacted, the execution of which will strengthen the change. The other way of development is when 
change becomes a necessary consequence, as a result of the existing legal situation, primarily due to the 
activity of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the courts of the MS. The landmark decisions 
of the courts indicate the path of this development, but these innovations and changes only apply to a 
small section of law (to a specific type of case, to a specific legal institution). As an example, the earlier 
battle of the Council and the Commission may be mentioned on whether EU law regarding crimes 
damaging the environment should be issued by so-called directive or framework decision. The problem 
is easy to understand without a detailed explanation: considering that the EU policy on environmental 
protection is an EU competence, the question was, whether this power includes criminal law as a 
means of protection and the establishment of its frames at the EU level. Not a political consensus was 
necessary here, but the interpretation of one provision of the EU Founding Treaty, which was done 
by the Court of Justice by declaring that in the interest of implementing EU policy, criminal law as a 
regulatory system is applicable, such regulation does not behave differently.3
In the establishment of the legal framework evolving along the above two lines, we may see the 
following substantial key points:
 – facilitating and legalizing criminal cooperation between the MS (legal assistance type of 
cooperation and police cooperation as well),
 – working on achieving the joint European justice region (e.g. development concerning 
jurisdictional conflicts, prohibition of double jeopardy, ne bis in idem, etc.),
 – approximation of the facts and sanctions of crimes,
3 C-176/03 Commission v Council, on 13 September 2005; ECLI:EU:C:2005:542
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 – legal approximation in criminal procedure, primarily by introducing the same standards in the 
fundamental rights context,
 – strengthening the obligation of EU-conform interpretation of criminal law rules.
Below, we will provide a sneak peek into the results of this development: some significant 
achievements will be briefly introduced to present the dynamics and some important directions of 
development.
13.5.1. The European Arrest Warrant
Extradition, in the traditional sense, is conceptually excluded between the European Union MS, 
as they eliminated the difficult system full of political constraints in their relations, and introduced 
the institution of the European Arrest Warrant (EAW, 2002). The arrest warrant is such a justice 
decision, which obliges the authorities of the MS regardless of their place of operation, and concerns 
the arrest and transfer of the person wanted. Therefore, essentially, the extradition is replaced by the so-
called transfer procedure that has lost its political characteristic, functions as a purely legal process, 
and it is a very successful EU “project”. Instead of the former, average 18-24 months long extradition 
procedures, today the transfer of wanted persons takes place within 90 days between EU MS.
13.5.2. One Crime, One Conviction?
The unique legal development represents a particularly important achievement of the EU cooperation 
regarding judgments in criminal matters. If someone committed a crime and was held accountable for it 
(for instance, already served the imposed imprisonment), this accountability, essentially, is only linked 
to the given state. This means that the criminal judgment is the ultimate embodiment of the given state’s 
criminal demand (more precisely, the final criminal judgment consumes the criminal demand), but it 
has no relevance in relation to other states. Therefore, if a case emerges, which invokes the criminal 
demand of more states, a judgment delivered in one state does not satisfy the criminal demand of 
another state. For instance, we could mention a case where a Hungarian citizen would become a victim 
of a homicide or robbery in Spain, committed by a German citizen perpetrator. In the case at hand, all 
three countries’ criminal demand (and jurisdiction) apply to the act, and most likely, first, the Spanish 
criminal procedure would be conducted against the perpetrator (in case he was apprehended there), but 
the traditional rules and customs do not exclude that following the first criminal procedure the other 
countries may also proceed against the perpetrator. There is a right to free movement in the European 
Union, which is applicable to EU citizens and, on certain conditions, other people as well, however 
it caused a paradigm-shift in this field, since there is the mutual recognition based on mutual trust 
between the EU states: if the perpetrator was already punished in one state and served its sentence, he 
does not need to expect that another EU state will enforce its criminal demand against him.
Principle of transnational ne bis in idem: this principle means the prohibition of double 
(two-times) conviction or punishment. Currently, respecting this prohibition is a legal 
obligation for the European Union states, and Article 5. of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union declares that “[n]o one shall be liable to be tried or 
punished again in criminal proceedings for an offence for which he or she has already 
been finally acquitted or convicted within the Union in accordance with the law.”
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13.5.3. The European Public Prosecutor’s Office
In 2020, the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) will be established and will start its work as a 
new institution, its most important task being to investigate crimes against the EU’s financial interests 
(e.g. corruption, fraud, money laundering etc.) that affect more MS, within its own jurisdiction with the 
territorial competence over the whole of Europe (the territory of EU countries), and to coordinate and 
to provide assistance in similar investigations for the authorities of MS. The EPPO will be established 
under a special legal framework (so-called enhanced cooperation), which means that only those MS 
may participate, which explicitly declare it. For now, Hungary does not participate in the enhanced 
cooperation.
13.5.4. The European Police Office
Europol is the law enforcement agency of the European Union, with its task being to assist the MS 
law enforcement and the work of police and other authorities with similar tasks. As part of this task, 
it coordinates and provides on-site support in transnational law enforcement operations, promotes the 
exchange of information between MS authorities and conducts forensic science work for them. Europol 
does not deal with wanted persons or objects. Europol officials are typically police officers delegated by 
any MS, but they have no right to directly investigate in the territory of MS. It is seated in The Hague.
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QUESTIONS FOR SELF-CHECK
1. What is criminal law accountability and what is its connection with punitive power?
2. What is the general definition of legal order?
3. What is the general characteristic of criminal liability?
4. Define the principles of nullum crimen sine lege and nulla poena sine lege!
5. What does it mean that criminal liability is guilt-based?
6. On what basis does the legislator classify an act as a crime?
7. What does it mean that criminal law has a culture-dependent aspect?
8. What does it mean that culpability changes over time as well?
9. What states adopted the Three Allied Powers Declaration? What was its essence and significance?
10. When (and how) the ICC was established, since when does it operate?
11. What cases are administered by the ICC?
12. What does the principle of complementarity mean?
13. Introduce the essence of the Lubanga case!
14. What is the purpose of international criminal cooperation?
15. Look for contemporary press releases (2012-2013), which suggest possible political reasons 
regarding the Safarov case!
16. Examine under the Convention adopted in 1983 (Act XX of 1994, adopted in Strasbourg on 23 
March 1983 on the promulgation of the Convention on the transfer of sentenced persons), whether 
the legal requirements were met to transfer the Azeri citizen?
17. What is the most important conceptual difference between the states’ traditional criminal 
cooperation and the EU countries’ criminal cooperation?
18. What is the EAW?
19. What is the difference between extradition and transfer procedure?
20. What will be the task of the EPPO?
21. What is the difference between Europol and Interpol?
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